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ince the founding era of this country, liberty has never included the 
freedom of one to pursue his or her own self-interest at the cost of 
causing harm to others. On the contrary, although individual citizens 
are free to pursue their own happiness and interests in accord with their 
own vision, that pursuit “must submit to reasonable and considerate 
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restraints”1 so that “no man . . . can have a right to infringe the natural 
rights, liberties or privileges of others.”2 
Protection from injury by another is the other side of liberty’s coin.3 
The civil jury is the American institution that provides that protection. 
A civil jury’s damages verdict not only provides a remedy to restore 
the losses suffered by a person wrongfully injured by another, but it 
also deters such injurious conduct in the future by holding the wrongful 
actor financially accountable for those losses. For that reason, the 
founders of this nation considered the civil jury the “very palladium” 
of a free society.4 As James Madison described, “[t]rial by jury cannot 
be considered as a natural right, but a right resulting from a social 
compact, which regulates the action of the community, [and] is as 
essential to secure the liberty of the people as any one of the pre-
existent rights of nature.”5 
Because the civil jury uniquely secures the liberty of each citizen 
from infringement by another, the civil jury trial has been guaranteed 
in the U.S. Constitution and the constitutions of the states.6 
The authority of the civil jury is not limited by power or wealth and 
may be used to hold “the most powerful individual[s] in the state” 
accountable for “inva[ding] another’s right.”7 However, its ability to 
 
1 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
1789−1800, at 308, 310 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 1988) (U.S. Supreme Court Justice James 
Iredell’s statement to a grand jury (Oct. 12, 1792)). 
2 Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 
YALE L.J. 907, 927 (1993) (quoting Peter Powers, Reverend, Jesus Christ the True King and 
Head of Government, A Sermon Preached Before the General Assembly of the State of 
Vermont, on the Day of Their First Election (Mar. 12, 1778)). 
3 See id. at 927–28 (explaining that “the equality of liberty had implications for the extent 
of liberty; it suggested that there were some limits on an individual’s freedom to do as he or 
she pleased and that these limits consisted of the equal rights of others. Put another way, the 
analysis of equal liberty implied a definition of injury . . . .”). 
4 THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (recognizing that the supporters of the 
constitutional protections for the civil jury trial saw it as the “very palladium of free 
government”). See generally Palladium, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE, http://webstersdictionary1828.com/Dictionary/palladium (last visited Feb. 2, 
2018) (defining “palladium” as “something that affords effectual defense, protection and 
safety; as when we say, the trial by jury is the palladium of our civil rights”). 
5 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 437 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of James 
Madison). 
6 U.S. CONST. amend. VII (providing federal constitutional protections for the civil jury 
trial); TAYLOR ASEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND COURT 
DECISIONS ON TRIAL BY JURY (2011) (listing the state constitutional protections for the civil 
jury). 
7 See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 380 
(1768). 
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provide a check on the conduct of the powerful has made it the natural 
target of the powerful.8 For the last forty years, “the civil justice system 
as a whole, and the civil jury particularly, have been the targets of a 
sustained attack by” powerful interest groups that seek to avoid paying 
the costs for the harms they cause others in the course of advancing 
their own interests.9 Such groups have consistently lobbied state 
legislatures to pass statutes that limit the amount of jury-assessed 
damages that a court can impose against a person or corporation that 
wrongfully harms another, no matter how egregious the conduct or how 
profound the harm caused.10 
For example, in 1991, the state of Oregon passed a damages cap that 
limited the liability of the state and its employees to $200,000 for any 
harms they may cause an Oregonian.11 Under that law, if a state 
employee recklessly drove a government vehicle and caused a child to 
suffer paralysis, the maximum compensation that child could receive 
 
8 Sheldon Whitehouse, Restoring the Civil Jury’s Role in the Structure of Our 
Government, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1241, 1254 (2014). 
9 See id. 
10 See id. at 1254–55. 
11 See OR. REV. STAT. § 30.270(1)(b) (1991) (repealed 2009). A brief history of this 
statute, known as the Oregon Tort Claims Act, is worth noting. In most states, sovereign 
immunity was a common law doctrine only, and, accordingly, state supreme courts had 
authority to dispose of it. Because the doctrine of sovereign immunity was rooted in the 
archaic notion that a lord has the privilege to kill or maim his subjects without consequence, 
a notion that was irrational in a democratic society, most state courts abandoned it in the 
mid-twentieth century. See generally Ronald B. Lansing, The King Can Do Wrong! The 
Oregon Tort Claims Act, 47 OR. L. REV. 357, 358 (1968) (discussing the disfavor of the 
common law doctrine of sovereign immunity). However, in 1961, the Oregon Supreme 
Court interpreted article IV, section 24, of the Oregon Constitution as constitutionally 
preserving the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity and providing that only the 
legislature could waive that immunity. See Vendrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 26C Malheur Cty., 
226 Or. 263, 278, 360 P.2d 282, 289 (1961) (“Our Constitution is framed on the premise 
that the state is immune from suit and that if immunity is lifted it shall be done so by the 
action of the legislature.”); see also Borden v. City of Salem, 249 Or. 39, 49, 436 P.2d 734, 
739 (1968) (Goodwin, J., concurring) (“Whether or not sovereign immunity is a disfavored 
policy in a majority of the states is irrelevant in this state.” (citing Vendrell, 226 Or. at 263, 
360 P.2d at 282)). The Oregon legislature thereafter passed the Oregon Tort Claims Act in 
1967 and partially waived sovereign immunity for the state’s tortious conduct. See generally 
Lansing, supra. Over the following fifty years, the statute was amended numerous times. 
OR. REV. STAT. § 30.260 (chronicling enactment and amendments from 1967−2009). The 
1991 statute cited in the beginning of this footnote is one such version of the Act. 
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for the harm to her life and liberty was $200,000, even if a civil jury 
assessed those harms to be far in excess of that amount.12 
Similarly, in 1987, the Oregon legislature passed a damages cap that 
limited the liability of private actors, including corporations, to 
$500,000 for noneconomic harms they cause to any Oregonian.13 
Again, under that law, it does not matter if the harm permanently 
destroyed a person’s liberty to freely live his or her life (such as in cases 
of permanent paralysis, debilitating brain injury, or death), or that a jury 
reasonably assessed that the profound harms caused far exceeded the 
capped amount. Under the statute, the wrongful actor would have no 
obligation to compensate the person injured for any harms that a jury 
valued above the $500,000 cap. Said differently, rather than protect the 
liberty of the injured person, the cap provides a privilege for wrongful 
actors to cause profound harms and violations of human liberty without 
an obligation to compensate for all the harms inflicted. 
In Lakin v. Senco Products Inc., the Oregon Supreme Court 
addressed whether the $500,000 statutory cap violated the right to a 
civil jury trial under article I, section 17, of the Oregon Constitution.14 
There, the defendant manufactured and sold a defective nail gun.15 As 
a result of that defect, the gun shot a nail into the skull of John Lakin, 
causing him to suffer a life-changing brain injury and partial 
paralysis.16 The jury found that Mr. Lakin suffered $2 million in 
damages for those harms to the quality of his life.17 However, the trial 
court applied the statutory cap on noneconomic damages and reduced 
the manufacturer’s liability for those damages to $500,000.18 
On appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court, the manufacturer argued, 
among other things, that Oregon’s Constitution was not violated 
because the statutory cap was applied after the jury made its 
determination of damages; therefore, Mr. Lakin had enjoyed his 
 
12 See Clarke v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 343 Or. 581, 610, 175 P.3d 418, 434 (2007) 
(holding that this cap on damages violated the injured party’s right to a remedy under article 
I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution). 
13 OR. REV. STAT. § 18.560(1) (1987), amended by OR. REV. STAT. § 31.710(1) (2017). 
14 Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 329 Or. 62, 987 P.2d 463, modified, 329 Or. 369, 987 P.2d 
476 (1999), overruled by Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or. 168, 250, 376 P.3d 
998, 1044 (2016); see also OR. CONST. art. I, § 17 (“In all civil cases the right of Trial by 
Jury shall remain inviolate.”). 
15 Lakin, 329 Or. at 67, 987 P.2d at 467. 
16 Id. at 67–68, 987 P.2d at 467. 
17 Id. at 66, 987 P.2d at 466. 
18 Id. at 66–67, 987 P.2d at 466. 
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procedural right to a jury trial.19 The court rejected the argument, 
explaining that it 
ignores the constitutional magnitude of the jury’s fact-finding 
province, including its role to determine damages. [To argue contra 
is to assert] that the right to trial by jury is not invaded if the jury is 
allowed to determine facts which go unheeded when the court issues 
its judgment. Such an argument pays lip service to the form of the 
jury but robs the institution of its function.20 
For that and other reasons, the Lakin court ultimately held that the 
statutory cap on damages “prevent[ed] the jury’s award from having its 
full and intended effect,” and, consequently, violated Mr. Lakin’s right 
to a civil jury trial under the Oregon Constitution.21 
But Lakin was not long for this world. Recently, in Horton v. Oregon 
Health & Science University, the Oregon Supreme Court overruled 
Lakin.22 There, the jury found that a state employee caused an infant 
child to suffer over $6 million in economic losses and an additional $6 
million in noneconomic losses.23 The state pointed to a new statutory 
cap on damages for all cases involving state actors and argued that the 
statute required the trial court to order that the state should pay less than 
twenty-five percent of the costs of the harms it caused the child.24 
The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed Oregon’s constitutional 
protections for the civil jury and explained that the state constitution 
did not prevent Oregon’s legislature from passing a statutory cap that 
effectively vetoed the jury’s damages verdict.25 The court held that 
whatever protections article I, section 17, may afford a litigant, it did 
not prevent the state legislature from requiring a judge to reduce the 
accountability of the defendant for the harms the litigant caused or to 
otherwise reduce the amount the jury deemed necessary to restore the 
liberty and quality of life that the defendant took from the injured 
person.26 As a result, Oregon’s constitutional guarantee of a civil jury 
for the protection of liberty yields to the power of the state legislature 
 
19 See id. at 79, 987 P.2d at 473. 
20 Id. at 79–80, 987 P.2d at 473 (alteration in original) (quoting Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 
771 P.2d 711, 721 (Wash. 1989) (holding that statutory caps on damages violate the right to 
a jury trial under Washington’s Constitution)). 
21 Lakin, 329 Or. at 79, 987 P.2d at 473. 
22 Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or. 168, 244, 376 P.3d 998, 1044 (2016). 
23 Id. at 171, 376 P.3d at 1002. 
24 See id. at 172–73, 376 P.3d at 1002. 
25 Id. at 250, 376 P.3d at 1044. 
26 See id. at 244, 376 P.3d at 1041. 
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to grant defendants the privilege to violate the liberty and freedom of 
others without accountability. 
This Article questions the Oregon Supreme Court’s analysis and, 
ultimately, its holding in Horton. Specifically, the Article reviews the 
history of the civil jury trial, leading up to its inclusion in the Oregon 
Constitution. It compares that history to the historical conclusions 
emphasized by the Horton court to justify its decision. The comparison 
suggests that the court’s reasoning in Horton is flawed by the omission 
of important historical context and events. The Article concludes that 
Horton was wrongly decided and that the court should revisit the matter 
at the earliest opportunity to restore the protections afforded to 
Oregon’s citizens by the civil jury. 
I 
THE ENGLISH JURY AND THE HORTON COURT 
In Horton, the court acknowledged the influence of the English 
understanding of the civil jury before the American Revolution on 
Oregon’s constitutional protections of the institution: 
In considering [the scope of the right to a jury trial], we begin with 
Blackstone, whose writing on the civil jury trial was influential in 
shaping American thought on that issue . . . . In describing the 
attributes of the right, Blackstone focused solely on the procedures 
associated with jury trials . . . . In focusing on the procedural benefits 
of civil jury trials, Blackstone did not suggest that the right to a civil 
jury imposed a substantive limit on the ability of . . . parliament to 
define the legal principles that create and limit a person’s liability.27 
In other words, the Horton court suggests that the English 
understanding of the civil jury, which was eventually passed on to the 
American colonies, was merely a procedural institution and that 
Parliament was free to legislatively limit any liability suggested by a 
jury’s findings. 
That is not so. As shown in the historical review below, the jury was 
not an institution subjugated to government, but represented a unique 
allocation of governing power to the people. The English jury 
preserved in the hands of the people the authority to administer justice 
over the decisions of Parliament or any other government office. 
During the medieval beginnings of the English common law, civil 
disputes, which largely involved controversies between tenants and 
 
27 Id. at 236–38, 376 P.3d at 1036–37. 
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landowners, were resolved in favor of those with access to power. 28 
England embraced the practice of trial by combat in which the opposing 
parties championed their own causes by fighting one another to 
submission or death.29 The loser of the fight lost everything—land, 
dignity, and protections of law.30 Moreover, trial was not a fair fight. 
By rule, a party could produce a hired champion in court, who was paid 
to fight in place of the disputing party,31 but that privilege to substitute 
a hired fighter belonged to landowners only. A tenant could not 
“substitute another in Court for the purpose of undertaking the defence, 
unless it be his own lawful Son [sic].”32 In the end, the facts and merits 
of the dispute did not matter, it was those with access to power and 
wealth that directed the course of justice. 
That medieval institution of trial decided by power and wealth 
eventually gave way to procedures to ensure justice on the merits of the 
case through the Grand Assize.33 Considered to be far more equitable 
than trial by battle, the Grand Assize marked the beginnings of the civil 
jury in which “twelve lawful Knights” would decide “which of the 
litigating parties, ha[d] the greater right” to prevail based on their 
weighing of “the testimony of many credible witnesses.”34 The practice 
of trials on the merits by indifferent men, not government officials, 
spread and eventually developed into the trial by jury enjoyed 
throughout England.35 
Through the centuries, the civil jury trial came to be considered the 
“glory of the English Law” because it allocated governing authority to 
community members to hold powerful and wealthy individuals 
accountable for wrongs committed on those of lesser station.36 In 1768, 
William Blackstone explained: 
[A] competent number of sensible and upright jurymen . . . will be 
found the best investigators of truth, and the surest guardians of 
 
28 HUNT JANIN, MEDIEVAL JUSTICE: CASES AND LAWS IN FRANCE, ENGLAND AND 
GERMANY, 500-1500, 86–87 (2004); JOHN BEAMES, A TRANSLATION OF GLANVILLE: A 
TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE KINGDOM OF ENGLAND 46 (1812). 
29 JANIN, supra note 28, at 86–87. 
30 Id. at 87. 
31 BEAMES, supra note 28, at 46. 
32 Id. 
33 See id. at 54. 
34 Id. at 56, 58. 
35 See Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Underappreciated 
History, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 591 (1993). 
36 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at 379–81. 
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public justice. For the most powerful individual in the state will be 
cautious of committing any flagrant invasion of another’s right, when 
he knows that the fact of his oppression must be examined and 
decided by twelve indifferent men, not appointed till the hour of trial; 
and that, when once the fact is ascertained, the law must of course 
redress it. This therefore preserves in the hands of the people that 
share which they ought to have in the administration of public justice, 
and prevents the encroachments of the more powerful and wealthy 
citizens.37 
Blackstone’s description of the civil jury emphasized several 
fundamental and substantive values that the English saw in the 
institution. Indeed, far from the Horton court’s suggestion to the 
contrary, Blackstone did not “focus[] solely on the procedures 
associated with jury trials” when describing the value of the 
institution.38 Rather, Blackstone significantly focused on England’s 
allocation of substantive decision-making authority in the jury and how 
that allocation provides a superior means to ensure justice on equitable 
terms and ultimately preserves liberty. 
Blackstone emphasized that the civil jury assumed governing 
authority as the “guardians of public justice,” whose authority reached 
to the “most powerful individual in the state.”39 He suggested that the 
mere threat of being held accountable by a jury would cause “the most 
powerful individual in the state [to] be cautious of committing any 
flagrant invasion of another’s right.”40 Blackstone did not indicate, as 
the Horton court suggests, that Parliament could limit the liability of 
those before the jury. On the contrary, he suggested the opposite when 
he stated that there was no person in England beyond the reach of the 
civil jury’s authority to administer justice. 
Blackstone also emphasized that the institution “preserves [the 
administration of public justice] in the hands of the people,” rather than 
the “powerful and wealthy.”41 That preservation in the hands of the 
people is directly at odds with the Horton court’s suggestion that 
Blackstone indicated that the power was preserved in Parliament to 
limit the authority of the jury to impose liability. The Horton court’s 
view, that the jury’s decision-making authority necessarily yields to 
whatever limitations Parliament sees fit, preserves nothing in the hands 
of the people. Contrary to Blackstone, Horton ultimately determined 
 
37 Id. at 380. 
38 Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or. 168, 236, 376 P.3d 998, 1037 (2016). 
39 BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at 380. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
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that once the fact is ascertained by the jury, the law need not redress it, 
but instead can ignore it.42 
Blackstone’s description also highlighted that the civil jury ensured 
that the administration of justice was not predetermined, but instead 
turned on the decision-making authority of “indifferent” persons 
appointed at the hour of trial. Justice was meted out on the merits and 
nothing else.43 The Horton court suggests that Parliament was free to 
set a limitation on liability so low that the outcome of the jury’s 
decision is, as a practical matter, predetermined and substantively 
meaningless. For example, in the Horton court’s view, Parliament 
could freely pass legislation that all defendants that a jury finds liable 
for assault will pay no more than a penny’s worth of damages, no matter 
the jury’s finding of the actual damages caused. Such ability of 
Parliament to predetermine the substantive meaning of a civil jury trial 
is directly contrary to Blackstone’s description of the jury’s authority 
arising at the time of trial to indifferently administer justice based on 
the facts at hand. 
Notwithstanding the analysis of the Horton court, Blackstone 
particularly warned the English against allowing any limitation on the 
authority of the jury to resolve civil disputes. He urged that 
the decision of facts, without the intervention of a jury, . . . is a step 
towards establishing aristocracy, the most oppressive of absolute 
governments . . . . It is therefore, upon the whole, a duty which every 
man owes to his country, his friends, his posterity, and himself, to . . 
. guard with the most jealous circumspection against the introduction 
of new and arbitrary methods of trial, which, under a variety of 
plausible pretences [sic], may in time imperceptibly undermine this 
best preservative of English liberty.44 
In sum, the Horton court incorrectly described the English jury as 
merely a preferred procedure for fact finding that yielded to 
parliamentary whims to take away the institution’s authority to protect 
the liberty of the citizenry. On the contrary, the English believed that 
the necessary authority to protect against undue harms and guard 
against injustice was preserved in the civil jury and was not to be freely 
manipulated by Parliament. 
 
42 See Horton, 359 Or. at 253–54, 376 P.3d at 1046. Compare id. with BLACKSTONE, 
supra note 7, at 380 (“[W]hen once the fact is ascertained, the law must of course redress it. 
This therefore preserves in the hands of the people that share which they ought to have in 
the administration of public justice . . . .”). 
43 BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at 380. 
44 Id. at 380–81. 
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II 
THE CIVIL JURY IN THE FOUNDING ERA AND THE HORTON COURT 
The Horton court also concluded that the history of the civil jury 
during the founding era of the United States indicates that the founders 
valued the institution solely because a jury provided a superior 
procedural mechanism to a judge for deciding facts.45 The Horton court 
further suggested that the historical record does not indicate that the 
founders had any desire to limit the ability of the legislature to freely 
curtail the authority of the civil jury. 
[B]efore the revolution, one issue that divided the colonies from 
England was “the extent to which colonial administrators were 
making use of judge-tried cases to circumvent the right of civil jury 
trial.” . . . The concern . . . was that decision-making authority was 
being improperly shifted from a jury composed of American citizens 
to a judge who was beholden to a British monarch. The perceived 
value of a civil jury trial lay in the jury’s ability to provide a fair 
application of the law to the facts in an individual case, not in any 
substantive limitation that the civil jury trial placed on the 
legislature’s lawmaking authority. 
 Despite the value that the colonists placed on having a jury rather 
than a colonial judge decide civil claims, the Constitutional 
Convention did not include a civil jury trial guarantee in the 
constitution, although the convention did guarantee a jury trial in 
criminal cases . . . . 
 When the states were deciding whether to ratify the constitution, 
one of the primary objections to the federal constitution was that it 
lacked a bill of rights, including a right to a civil jury trial in the 
federal courts. One argument was that by providing for jury trials in 
criminal but not civil cases, the constitution had, sub silentio, 
eliminated a right to civil jury trials in the federal courts. [In 
Federalist No. 83,] Hamilton explained, however, that the 
constitution did not prohibit the use of civil juries in federal court but 
instead had left it to Congress to decide in which class of civil cases 
jury trials should be available. In Hamilton’s view, the strongest 
argument for guaranteeing a right to a civil jury trial was to check 
biased or corrupt judges . . . . Hamilton explained, the better course 
was the one that the Constitutional Convention had chosen—leaving 
it to Congress to define which class of civil cases should be tried to a 
jury and which should be tried to a judge . . . . 
 Despite Hamilton’s arguments against including a civil jury trial 
right in the federal constitution, the anti-federalists’ objections to the 
right’s omission “struck a very responsive chord in the public” and 
ultimately carried the day . . . . [T]he anti-federalists’ objections were 
not based solely on the ground that juries would be more accurate 
than judges. Rather . . . [they] intimated . . . that juries would provide 
 
45 Horton, 359 Or. at 241–43, 376 P.3d at 1039–40. 
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American debtors greater relief from British creditors than federal 
judges would. That intimation did not reflect a belief that the right to 
a civil jury trial would impose a substantive limitation on legislatures 
. . . . 
 After the states ratified the constitution and Congress took up the 
Bill of Rights, an 11-person committee proposed the essence of what 
became the [right to a civil jury trial under the] Seventh 
Amendment.46 
In short, the Horton court concluded that the founders only 
constitutionally guaranteed that a civil jury, rather than a judge, must 
decide the facts in the case, but such constitutional protection did not 
prohibit the legislature from limiting liability that necessarily flows 
from those facts. 
However, a more thorough review of the history yields a different 
conclusion. Three things in particular indicate that the founders wished 
to prevent legislative encroachment on the decision-making authority 
of civil juries: (1) how the colonists viewed the authority of the civil 
jury before the revolutionary era, (2) how the colonists viewed the role 
of the civil jury in relation to the legislation of Parliament and the 
crown during the revolutionary era, and (3) the civil jury authority 
demanded and won by constitutional delegates during the ratification 
of the Constitution. 
A. The Authority of the Civil Jury in the Prerevolution Colonies 
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, and its 
elevation of the jury trial as the glory of the English law, was a best 
seller in the colonies.47 During the time before the Revolution, the civil 
jury “sank deep roots into American soil” as an institution to redress 
individual grievances and preserve liberty.48 That was particularly so 
because it was one of the only offices of colonial governance in which 
Parliament permitted the colonists to exercise substantial authority.49 
The colonists particularly understood that civil jury authority 
extended to awarding large money damages against the government 
itself for violating a citizen’s rights. For example, during the 1760s, the 
 
46 Id. at 239–42, 376 P.3d at 1038–40 (internal citations omitted). 
47 Suja A. Thomas, Blackstone’s Curse: The Fall of the Criminal, Civil, and Grand Juries 
and the Rise of the Executive, the Legislature, the Judiciary, and the States, 55 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1195, 1200 (2014). 
48 Whitehouse, supra note 8, at 1246–47. 
49 Id. 
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colonists were keenly aware of the case of John Wilkes.50 Wilkes 
accused the King of England of lying and was arrested and charged 
with seditious libel.51 The case was dismissed, Wilkes sued for 
damages against the head of the English government, and the jury 
awarded him £1000, an extraordinary sum at the time.52 The Lord 
Chief Justice of England declared that the jury held the authority to 
award such damages even if it was “for more than the injury received” 
because a jury’s “[d]amages are designed not only as a satisfaction to 
the injured person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to deter 
from any such proceeding for the future, and as proof of the detestation 
of the jury to the action itself.”53 
Contrary to the court’s statements in Horton, the prerevolutionary 
colonists understood that the civil jury was more than a procedural 
mechanism of fact finding; it was rather an institution that retained the 
authority necessary to hold even the head of the national government 
accountable for violating another’s rights through damages verdicts. 
B. The Authority of the Civil Jury in the Revolutionary Era 
The colonists view that a fundamental purpose of the civil jury was 
to provide a substantive limit on government authority was further 
developed during the revolutionary era. For the colonist at that time, 
the jury was “linked to political power”54 and provided a forum to 
challenge English authority.55 
As antagonism grew between the colonies and England, Parliament 
passed oppressive legislation, such as the Stamp Act and the 
Navigation Act, which substantively limited the authority of the 
colonial jury in many civil cases.56 George Mason, in his 1766 Letter 
To the Committee of Merchants in London, warned that such English 
threats to the trial by jury caused significant dispute between England 
and the colonies.57 Ultimately, such limits placed by Parliament on the 
 
50 Landsman, supra note 35, at 591. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. (quoting MARK PETERSON ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
489–99 (1987)). 
54 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Jury as Constitutional Identity, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1105, 1118 (2014). 
55 See generally Landsman, supra note 35, at 594–96; Whitehouse, supra note 8, at 1247. 
56 Landsman, supra note 35, at 595−96. 
57 1 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 67 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1970). 
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authority of the jury served to help unite the thirteen colonies towards 
war against England.58 
For example, in opposition to the Stamp Act legislation and its 
deprivation of the jury trial, colonists formed the Stamp Act Congress 
of 1765 and demanded that trial by jury was the inherent right of every 
British subject in the colonies.59 Likewise, in the meeting of the First 
Continental Congress in 1774, the colonists took aim at other 
parliamentary legislation that removed certain cases to England for trial 
and at royal regulations that interfered with jury selection.60 That 
Congress declared “the respective colonies are entitled to the common 
law of England, and more especially to the great and inestimable 
privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage, according to the 
course of that law.”61 
In the Second Continental Congress, the colonists protested against 
further legislation of Parliament that deprived them “of the accustomed 
and inestimable privilege of trial by jury, in cases affecting both life 
and property.”62 Those repeated demands for trial by jury eventually 
culminated in the colonists listing the deprivation of the “Benefits of 
Trial by Jury” as an express grievance in the Declaration of 
Independence from England.63 
In short, the colonists went to war rather than allow Parliament to 
legislatively limit the authority of the jury. The colonists did not view 
the jury as the Horton court suggests, a mere procedural factfinder 
whose authority may ebb and flow by legislative fiat. Indeed, it was 
such legislative fiat to limit the civil jury’s authority that poked the bear 
of revolution. 
C. The Authority of the Civil Jury Guaranteed by the Bill of Rights 
Unlike the criminal jury trial, the Constitution did not initially 
guarantee the jury in civil cases. That caused a critical debate between 
the federalists and the anti-federalists64 about whether the civil jury 
 
58 See Landsman, supra note 35, at 596. 
59 Id. at 595. 
60 Id. at 596. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776). 
64 Charles Wolfram suggests: 
 One of the earliest successes of the “federalists,” the party that eventually won 
the battle over the adoption of the Constitution, was to foist upon their opponents 
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needed constitutional protection.65 Alexander Hamilton, a federalist 
leader, advocated that the role of the civil jury was best decided by the 
legislature, and its absence from the Constitution distinctly gave the 
legislature the “liberty either to adopt that institution or to let it 
alone.”66 His lackluster defense of the institution is not surprising 
because, unlike the anti-federalists who saw the civil jury as “the very 
palladium of free government,” Hamilton admitted that he could not 
“readily discern the . . . connection between the existence of liberty, 
and the trial by jury in civil cases.”67 
The anti-federalists agreed with Hamilton that the omission of the 
civil jury from the Constitution gave permission for the legislature to 
limit the jury’s authority as it saw fit, but rather than seeing that as an 
advantage, they saw it “as portending a new form of tyranny.”68 That 
concern nearly prevented state ratification of the Constitution.69 
The anti-federalists argued for a bill of rights that constitutionally 
guaranteed a civil jury.70 “Historians of the period unanimously agree 
that the attack on the proposed Constitution by the antifederalists based 
on its omission of [such] a bill of rights struck a very responsive chord 
in the public.”71 
Certainly, as the Horton court described, the anti-federalists wanted 
constitutional protections for civil juries to protect citizens in the 
unique circumstances of debtor cases and to avoid undue influence 
from corrupt or biased judges.72 However, the demand for a 
constitutional guarantee for the civil jury also was born of the anti-
federalists’ desire to substantively limit the ability of the legislature to 
curtail the jury and to ensure that government was subject to damages 
 
the appellation “antifederalists.” The connotations of opposition to a system of 
state-national governments and of sheer obstructionism were well appreciated by 
the “antifederalists” who vigorously argued that the name was better deserved by 
the supporters of the Constitution, who in fact should not be regarded as 
“federalists,” but rather as “consolidationists” or “nationalists.” 
Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. 
REV. 639, 667 n.77 (1973). 
65  See Landsman, supra note 35, at 598–600. 
66 THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton). 
67 Id. 
68 Ferguson, supra note 54, at 1117. 
69 Id. 
70 See Wolfram, supra note 64, at 667. 
71 Id. at 668. 
72 See id. at 679–81 (discussing concerns in debtor cases); see also id. at 708–10 
(discussing concerns about corrupt judges). 
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verdicts for harming citizens. Charles Wolfram summarized the record 
of the debate as follows: 
[S]urviving materials demonstrate that the antifederalists advanced 
several distinct and specific arguments in favor of civil jury trial: the 
protection of debtor defendants; the frustration of unwise legislation; 
the overturning of the practices of courts of vice-admiralty; the 
vindication of the interests of private citizens in litigation with the 
government; and the protection of litigants against overbearing and 
oppressive judges.73 
Indeed, the anti-federalists believed that civil jury authority was 
essential “to offset . . . overzealous legislatures.”74 Consequently, anti-
federalists insisted on a constitutional guarantee of the civil jury, in 
particular “to guard against unwanted legislation passed by a misguided 
national legislature. Certainly the same potentially oppressive 
legislature that might pass obnoxious legislation could not be trusted to 
preserve a right of jury trial in cases arising under that legislation.”75 
George Mason, a prominent anti-federalist, advocated for 
“constitutional inclusion of the civil jury, because otherwise Congress 
could have as much influence as it desired on the decisions of the 
jury.”76 During the ratification debates he argued: 
[W]hat chance will poor men get, where Congress have the power of 
legislating in all cases whatever, and where judges and juries may be 
under their influence, and bound to support their operations? Even 
with juries the chance of justice may here be very small, as Congress 
have unlimited authority, legislative, executive, and judicial.77 
Likewise, at the Virginia ratification debates, James Monroe argued 
that a constitutional guarantee was necessary to prevent Congress from 
abolishing the civil jury: 
[S]uppose [Congress] should be of opinion that the right of the trial 
by jury was not one of the requisites to carry it into effect; there is no 
check in this Constitution to prevent the formal abolition of it . . . . 
They are not restrained or controlled from making any law, however 
oppressive in its operation, which they may think necessary to carry 
 
73 Id. at 670–71 (emphasis added). 
74 Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America, 62 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285, 289 
(1999). 
75 Wolfram, supra note 64, at 664–65. 
76 Suja A. Thomas, The Missing Branch of the Jury, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1261, 1280 (2016). 
77 Wolfram, supra note 64, at 684 n.111 (alteration in original) (quoting 3 THE DEBATES 
IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 
1787, at 431 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1891) [hereinafter Elliot DEBATES]). 
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their powers into effect. By this general, unqualified power, they may 
infringe not only on the trial by jury, but the liberty of the press . . . . 
Our great unalienable rights ought to be secured from being 
destroyed by such unlimited powers, either by a bill of rights, or by 
an express provision in the body of the Constitution.78 
The anti-federalists also highlighted the need for a constitutional 
guarantee for the civil jury to ensure that government infringement on 
citizen liberty could be deterred by large damage verdicts.79 
Reminiscent of the colonists’ keen awareness of the jury’s high 
damages verdict against the leader of the English government for 
violating a citizen’s liberties in the Wilkes case, discussed supra Part 
II, Section A, the founders sought constitutional preservation of the 
jury’s authority to render heavy damages verdicts to deter the 
government and its employees from harming the citizenry: 
 Suppose, therefore, that the military officers of Congress, by a 
wanton abuse of power, imprison the free citizens of the United 
States of America; suppose . . . that a constable, having a warrant to 
search for stolen goods, pulled down the clothes of a bed in which 
there was a woman and searched under her shift—suppose, I say, that 
they commit similar or greater indignities, in such cases a trial by jury 
would be our safest resource [to ensure that] heavy damages would 
at once punish the offender and deter others from committing the 
same.80 
Simply put, the founders sought a constitutional guarantee for the 
civil jury to preserve the institution’s ability to protect liberty and 
physical integrity from government intrusion, to substantively limit the 
ability of the legislature to impede the authority of the jury, and to 
ensure full and fair damages against state actors that caused harms to 
citizens. 
The anti-federalists would not ratify the Constitution unless the jury, 
instead of any other government office, held the decision-making 
authority in all cases brought before the judiciary. As the Federal 
Farmer, another famous anti-federalist, described: 
[B]y holding the jury’s right to return a general verdict in all [civil] 
cases sacred, we secure to the people at large, their just and rightful 
controul [sic] in the judicial department . . . . The body of the people, 
principally, bear the burdens of the community; they of right ought 
to have a controul [sic] in its important concerns, both in making and 
 
78 Wolfram, supra note 64, at 706 (quoting Elliot DEBATES, supra note 77, at 218). 
79 Thomas, supra note 76, at 1281–82. 
80 Wolfram, supra note 64, at 708 n.187 (quoting PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788, at 154 (John Bach McMaster & Frederick Dawson Stone eds., 
1888)). 
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executing the laws, otherwise they may, in a short time, be ruined . . 
. . This, and the democratic branch in the legislature, as was formerly 
observed, are the means by which the people are let into the 
knowledge of public affairs–are enabled to stand as the guardians of 
each others [sic] rights, and to restrain, by regular and legal measures, 
those who otherwise might infringe upon them.81 
Or as John Adams succinctly explained: “the common people, 
should have as complete a control . . . in every judgment of a court of 
judicature” as they do in the legislature.82 
In the end, Hamilton and the federalists lost in their effort to allow 
the legislature to control, limit, or dismantle the civil jury as it saw fit 
by the omission of a constitutional guarantee for such juries.83 The 
federalists needed nine ratifying states to approve the Constitution 
without a provision protecting the authority of the civil jury.84 Due to 
the demands and efforts of the anti-federalists, by August 1788, “five 
of the thirteen ratifying conventions had already made clear, in a series 
of formal declarations, that Americans wanted more jury safeguards . . 
. .”85 Ultimately, ratification of the Constitution would not happen until 
the two factions agreed that the provisions of the Bill of Rights, 
including the constitutional guarantee of the civil jury trial, also would 
be sent to the states for ratification. 86 And, once received, the states 
did indeed ratify the Bill of Rights.87 
As a result, the founders placed the civil jury trial within the 
constitutional scheme of the separation of powers. Americans would 
not see the jury trial right as “mere procedural formality, but [rather] a 
fundamental reservation of power in . . . constitutional structure . . . [to] 
ensure[ ] the people’s ultimate control . . . in the judiciary.”88 The jury 
would from then forward hold authority over decisions that affect the 
liberty and rights of individual citizens in civil trials, and no 
government official or body was entitled to intrude upon that decision 
making; the civil juror as a fact finder was elevated to “a constitutional 
 
81 Letter from the Federal Farmer, No. 15 (Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION 397 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 2000). 
82 JOHN ADAMS, 2 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 253 (Charles C. Little & James Brown eds., 
1850). 
83 Whitehouse, supra note 8, at 1251–52. 
84 Wolfram, supra note 64, at 696. 
85 Whitehouse, supra note 8, at 1251 (quoting AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S 
CONSTITUTION: A BIBLIOGRAPHY 236 (2005)). 
86 Whitehouse, supra note 8, at 1252. 
87 See U.S. CONST. amends. I–X. 
88 See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004). 
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officer—the constitutional equal” to legislative, executive, and judicial 
officers.89 
The above understanding of the U.S. constitutional history of the 
civil jury trial indicates several serious errors in the Oregon Supreme 
Court’s historical conclusions in Horton. First, although the court 
extensively cites to Wolfram’s scholarship, it appears that the court 
failed to appreciate essential findings by Wolfram. Indeed, the Horton 
court offered a myopic view of Wolfram’s conclusions: 
Wolfram explains that the antifederalists’ objections were not based 
solely on the ground that juries would be more accurate than judges. 
Rather, examining the speeches in the state ratifying conventions, 
Wolfram concluded that the speakers intimated, although they never 
expressly stated, that juries would provide American debtors greater 
relief from British creditors than federal judges would. That 
intimation did not reflect a belief that the right to a civil jury trial 
would impose a substantive limitation on legislatures. Rather, it 
reflected the belief that, in an individual case, a jury might adjudicate 
the facts in a way that would favor local interests over foreign ones.90 
The Horton court’s summary erroneously excludes Wolfram’s 
recognition that the anti-federalists’ demands for a constitutional 
guarantee for the civil jury trial were motivated by a desire to impose a 
substantive limitation on legislatures. Wolfram emphasized that the 
anti-federalists wished to secure civil jury authority from 
“frustration[s] of unwise legislation” and to ensure “the vindication of 
the interests of private citizens in litigation with the government.”91 He 
further explained that the anti-federalists sought a constitutional 
guarantee to specifically protect the civil jury authority from a 
“potentially oppressive legislature that might pass obnoxious 
legislation [to the] right of [a civil] jury trial.”92 
Of course, if the Horton court acknowledged those historical bases 
for the constitutional guarantee of the civil jury trial, it would have been 
far more difficult for the court to reach its holding that the 
constitutional protections for the civil jury trial do not prevent the 
legislature from passing statutes that frustrate the jury’s authority to 
 
89 William G. Young, Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Juries, Vanishing Constitution, 40 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67, 71 (2006). 
90 Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or. 168, 242, 376 P.3d 998, 1039–40 (2016) 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
91 Wolfram, supra note 64, at 670–71. 
92 Id. at 664–65. 
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“vindicat[e] the interest of private citizens in litigation with the 
government”93 through damages verdicts. 
The Horton court also inappropriately placed undue historical 
importance on Hamilton’s opinions of the civil jury in its analysis. The 
court even cited Hamilton’s opinions as authority to overturn Lakin 
(that the legislature could not substantively limit the liability found by 
the jury).94 The court explained: 
 Hamilton’s discussion of a right to a civil jury trial in The 
Federalist No. 83 bears on the issue that Lakin decided in two 
respects. First, the arguments for and against including a civil jury 
trial guarantee that Hamilton canvassed all addressed the jury’s value 
as a procedural corrective to potentially biased or, worse, corrupt 
judges serving as the triers of fact. Those arguments do not suggest 
that the right was viewed as a substantive limit on Congress’s 
lawmaking power. Second, Hamilton made that point expressly in 
responding to an argument “that trial by jury [serves as] a safeguard 
against an oppressive exercise of the power of taxation.” In 
addressing that argument, Hamilton explained that the right to a civil 
jury placed no limit on the legislature’s power to define the 
substantive law.95 
Hamilton should not be guiding the Horton court on this issue. As 
discussed in detail above, Hamilton’s opinions on the authority of the 
civil jury lost. His view that the legislature was free to limit the jury’s 
authority not only nearly prevented the U.S. Constitution from being 
ratified, but also was necessarily left to the dustbin of history when the 
anti-federalists extracted the constitutional guarantee of the civil jury 
trial in exchange for ratification. It was constitutionally agreed long ago 
that the opinions of Hamilton do not define the authority of the civil 
jury in relation to the legislature, and, consequently, the Horton court 
should not have cited those opinions as a basis to overrule Lakin. 
  
 
93 Cf. id. at 664–65, 670–71 with Horton, 359 Or. at 250, 376 P.3d at 1044 (“[I]t is 
difficult to see how the jury trial right renders a damages cap unconstitutional. Neither the 
text nor the history of the jury trial right suggests that it was intended to place a substantive 
limitation on the legislature’s authority to alter or adjust a party’s rights and remedies.”). 
94 Horton, 359 Or. at 240–43, 376 P.3d at 1039. 
95 Id. at 241, 376 P.3d at 1039 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
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III 
THE HORTON COURT AND OREGON’S CONSTITUTIONAL CIVIL JURY 
GUARANTEES 
In Horton, the court stated that “the relevant history of Article I, 
Section 17, comes primarily from the English practice reflected in 
Blackstone’s Commentaries and the history leading up to and 
surrounding the adoption of the Seventh Amendment.”96 This Article 
agrees with the Horton court to that extent. There is no historical 
evidence identified by this author that the drafters of the Oregon 
Constitution wished to provide less protection to the civil jury trial than 
those argued for by anti-federalists when passing the Seventh 
Amendment. 
On the contrary, Americans maintained a rigorous desire to preserve 
the authority of the civil jury up to the time the Oregon Constitution 
was adopted. For example, Alexis De Tocqueville indicated that the 
American people in the mid-nineteenth century regarded the jury as a 
separate institution of government and “a mode of the sovereignty of 
the people” distinctly fashioned to temper the tyranny of the majority.97 
There is nothing in the writing of De Tocqueville to suggest that the 
American people believed that their sovereign authority in the jury 
could be freely manipulated in any legislative session.98 
Drafters of the Oregon Constitution may have even expanded the 
authority of their civil juries through Oregon’s unique constitutional 
provisions. In their constitutional discussions and guarantees for the 
civil jury, the drafters distinctly identified the “right” or authority of 
the jury to decide not only the facts but also the “law.” Article I, section 
16, of the Oregon Constitution provides that “In all criminal cases 
whatever, the jury shall have the right to determine the law, and the 
facts under the direction of the Court as to the law, and the right of new 
trial, as in civil cases.”99 
Some members of the Constitutional Convention opposed 
recognizing that its plain terms prevented a court from having the “right 
to set aside a verdict where the jury were the judges of the law and 
facts” or that the uninformed jurors would need “magic” to “become 
 
96 Id. at 243, 376 P.3d at 1040. 
97 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 261 (Harvey C. Mansfield & 
Delba Winthrop trans., 2012). 
98 See generally id. 
99 OR. CONST. art. I, § 16 (emphasis added). 
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acquainted with the rules of law.”100 But those arguments were 
insufficient to defeat the bill and gave way to another member’s 
argument that the jury’s right to determine the law was necessary to 
protect against odious legislation when deciding cases.101 Soon after 
that explanation for the need of such a provision, another member of 
the convention moved to amend the provision to include the clause “as 
in civil cases,” reflecting their perception, comfort, and endorsement of 
civil jury power.102 And that constitutional provision passed as 
amended.103 
Pursuant to Oregon state history and the “relevant history . . . from 
the English practice reflected in Blackstone’s Commentaries and the 
history leading up to and surrounding the adoption of the Seventh 
Amendment,”104  it is no great leap to conclude that article I, section 
17, actually means what it says: “In all civil cases the right of Trial by 
Jury shall remain inviolate.” That is, the authority of the jury to decide 
the case shall remain “inviolate” and thereby suffer no manipulation by 
the legislature or any other government actor. 
CONCLUSION 
Oregon’s Constitution preserves the civil jury’s authority to 
“regulate[] the action of the community” so that it may secure “the 
liberty of the people.”105 The Oregon Constitution also preserves the 
authority of the civil jury to do that by levying a damages verdict that 
may restore an injured person for the harms that he or she has wrongly 
suffered at the hands of another. Likewise, the Oregon Constitution 
preserves a jury’s authority to render a civil defendant liable for 
compensatory damages to deter others from engaging in similar 
harmful conduct. In a free society, in which all citizens are entitled to 
live their lives as they see fit, the civil jury is the constitutional promise 
that secures the liberty of each citizen from infringement by another. 
The Oregon Supreme Court in Horton missed a critical opportunity 
to reinforce the authority of the civil jury so it could continue to protect 
 
100 THE OREGON CONSTITUTION AND PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1857, 313–14 (Charles Henry Carey ed., 1926). 
101 Id. at 314. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 314–15. 
104 Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or. 168, 243, 376 P.3d 998, 1040 (2016). 
105 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 437 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement by James 
Madison). 
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the individual liberties of Oregonians from wrongful invasions by 
others. As a result, the power of the jury to hold wrongful actors 
accountable—the very purpose of the jury—in Oregon has been 
weakened. 
The Oregon Supreme Court will have an opportunity to revisit the 
issue in future cases. It is the hope of the author that the court will take 
that opportunity to reimmerse itself in the history of the constitutional 
guarantees for a civil jury and reject the legislature’s statutory caps on 
damages that grant wrongful actors the privilege to cause profound 
harms without accountability. It is the hope of the author that the 
Oregon Supreme Court will take the opportunity to reinvigorate the 
authority of the civil jury as the “guardian of public justice.” 
 
